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Abstract
We test for scal policy sustainability in the UK for the period 1955-2006. We
nd evidence of sustainability with three structural breaks, respectively occurring in
the early 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s. UK scal policy has been sustainable
throughout the sample period except from 1973-1981 when a non-Ricardian regime
applied. For the remaining periods correction of scal disequilibrium occurs through
adjustments in public revenue rather than expenditure. Finally, we nd evidence of non-
linear scal adjustment, with UK authorities not reacting to relatively small decits;
but correcting exceedingly large decits and any temporary surpluses relatively fast.
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1 Introduction
In recent months scal policy sustainability has returned to the forefront of policy debate.
This follows the signicant increase in many countriespublic debt caused by the economic
downturn following the global credit crunch and government-sponsored banking rescue plans.
A countrys scal policy is sustainable when its intertemporal government budget constraint
(IBC) is met, implying that the stock of outstanding public debt is o¤set by expected future
primary surpluses. Sustainable scal policy excludes the possibility of ponzi games where
the government systematically services the cost of existing debt exclusively by issuing new
one. Investors willingness to hold the governments outstanding bonds depends on the
latters perceived ability to generate future surpluses by reducing excessive spending and/or
increasing public revenue. Doubts regarding this ability will cause the government di¢ culties
in marketing its debt (Quintos, 1995) and, after a critical threshold is surpassed, lead to a
non-Ricardian, scal-dominance regime where the IBC is met through higher ination rate
reducing the real value of outstanding bonds, as suggested by the scal theory of the price
level (see e.g. Leeper (1991), Woodford (1996, 1998a and 1998b)).
A country whose public nances have been hit particularly hard by the global nancial
crisis is the UK. In 2009, the UK decit to GDP ratio reached the level of 11.5%, the highest
among G7 members. This signicant worsening of the UKs scal outlook, and continuing
concerns regarding the UKs banking system fragile state, have raised concerns about the
sustainability of the UKs triple A credit rating, causing a lively debate on the optimal
extend and speed of scal adjustment. Existing studies suggest that the UK has a sound
record in correcting scal imbalances, both historically (see e.g. Ahmed and Rogers, 1995)
as well in recent years (see Considine and Gallagher, 2008). Given the increased current
focus on scal policy, empirical evidence regarding the sustainability of UK budget nances
is timelier than ever.
In this paper we revisit the question of UK scal policy sustainability from 1955 to the year
preceding the onset of the scal downturn, 2006. Compared to existing studies, our analysis
provides four distinct features. First, we test for scal policy sustainability accounting for
structural shifts in UK scal policy, identied using tests for endogenous structural breaks.
Second, we assess the sustainability of UK scal policy for each of the endogenously identied
scal regimes. Third, we test whether deviations from the path of sustainable scal dynamics
are corrected through adjustments in government revenue or expenditure. Finally, we test
for non-linear adjustment in UK scal policy.
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Our main ndings can be summarized as follows: First, the UK scal policy has been
sustainable over the period under examination. Second, it has been subject to three structural
breaks, respectively located in the early 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s. These dates
coincide with important shifts in UK scal policy, with the rst break moving government
nances away from sustainability and the remaining two towards it. Third, scal policy was
sustainable during all scal regimes, except from 1973-1981 when a non-Ricardian regime
applied. Fourth, correction of deviations from scal sustainability has been taking place
through adjustment of public revenue rather than expenditure. Finally, we nd evidence of
non-linearities in UK scal policy, with the UK government not reacting to relatively small
decit values; but correcting exceedingly large decits and any temporary surpluses relatively
fast.
Overall, our ndings conrm the status of the UK government as a historically sound
sovereign borrower; and suggest a fundamentally sound UK scal position at the eve of the
credit crunch crisis. Given, however, the depth of the ensuing banking crisis and worsening
of the UKs scal outlook, this does not leave any room for scal complacency. Having said
so, our ndings suggest is that in the coming years of scal consolidation UK authorities
will more likely than not enjoy the marketscondence in their historical ability to restore
sustainability, even in the face of large scal shocks such as the present one. Within the
current environment of increased risk aversion, and as the EMU sovereign debt crisis has
amply demonstrated, such market credibility will be a signicant advantage at the disposal
of UK authorities striving to maintain sustainable scal dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2 we review the relevant literature
on testing government sustainability constraint; in section 3 we discuss the data; in section
4 we present the linear test of government budget sustainability; in section 5 we present the
linear error correction models; in section 6 we analyse the issue of non-linear scal adjustment;
section 7 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
Existing studies on scal policy sustainability mainly address three questions. The rst,
and main one, is whether scal policy is sustainable or not. The second is whether scal
policy involves structural breaks. Finally, the third is whether scal adjustment involves
non-linearities. A basic concept in this literature is the governments intertemporal budget
constraint (IBC). To derive it Hakkio and Rush (1991) start from the standard governments
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budget constraint given by:
bt+1 = (1 + rt)bt + gt    t (1)
where bt denotes the current stock of outstanding public debt in real values, rt denotes
the real interest rate, gt denotes real government expenditure net of interest and  t is real
tax revenues. Taking expectation and solving for bt recursively we obtain
bt = Et
X
j=1
( t+j   gt+j)
(1 + r)j+1
+ lim
j !1
Et

bt+j+1
(1 + r)j+1

(2)
where Et is the expectation operator. Equation (2) describes the governments IBC sta-
ting that the stock of outstanding public debt must be o¤set by the present value of ex-
pected future primary surpluses. For this condition to be met the transversality condition
limj !1Et
n
bt+j+1
(1+r)j+1
o
= 0 must hold. This rules out ponzi schemes i.e. the possibility of
servicing government debt by issuing increasing new debt. Tests of scal policy sustainabil-
ity aim to determine whether the limit term in equation (2) converges to zero or innity,
respectively denoting sustainable and unsustainable public debt dynamic.
Such tests, focusing mainly but not exclusively on the United States, can be broadly
grouped into two categories. The rst applies unit root tests on government decit and/or
discounted debt series, with unit roots interpreted as evidence of unsustainable scal dynam-
ics. The early studies by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Hakkio and Rush (1986) assume
constant real interest rates and argue that a su¢ cient condition for the IBC to be met is for
the government decit net of interest payments to be stationary. Both studies reject the null
of unit root for US real decit and debt for the period 1960-1984 and 1962-1985 respectively.
Trehan and Walsh (1988) argue that the only necessary and su¢ cient condition for the IBC
to be met is for the decit series inclusive of interest payments to be statinonary. Using this
criterion they nd US public nances to be sustainable over the period 1890-1986. Kremers
(1989) applies unit root tests on government debt-to-GNP and interest-to-GNP ratios. He
nds US scal policy to be sustainable for most of the inter- and post-war period but not
sustainable after 1981. Wilcox (1989) introduces stochastic real interest rates. He argues
that the IBC may be satised even if the level of the primary debt is non-stationary; and
that the su¢ cient condition for sustainability is for the discounted value of public debt to
converge to zero. Using this criterion, he nds US scal policy to be unsustainable for the
post-1974 period.1
1Other studies adopting this approach include Féve and Hénin (2000) and Uctum and Wickens (2000).
Féve and Hénin (2000) use semi-annual data and test for scal policy sustainability for G7 countries, con-
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The second category applies tests for cointegration between public decit and debt or,
more frequently, government expenditure and government revenue. Haug (1991) tests for
cointegration between real government debt and real surplus using quarterly US data over the
period 1960-1986. He nds evidence of cointegration suggesting sustainable US scal policy.
MacDonald (1992) provides a similar analysis for the period 1951-1984. Using monthly
data, he reaches the opposite conclusion. On the other hand, Hakkio and Rush (1991) test
for cointegration between US real per capita government revenue and expenditure using
quarterly data for the period 1950-1988. Their cointegration regression is given by equation
(3) below
Rt = + Gt + "t (3)
where Rt and Gt respectively denote the logs of real government revenue and government
expenditure including interest on outstanding debt and "t is a random error term. Hakkio
and Rush (1991) assume stochastic real interest rates and argue that for scal policy to be
sustainable public revenue and expenditure should be cointegrated with  = 1. Using the
entire sample period, they nd these conditions to be met. However, they nd US scal policy
not to be sustainable following 1964, with evidence of non-cointegration being particularly
strong during the period 1976 -1988. Using the same cointegration methodology, Ahmed and
Rogers (1995) conclude that UK scal policy is sustainable over the period spanning over two
centuries. Corsetti and Roubini (1991) provide a similar analysis for selected EMU countries
nding that their government nances do not satisfy the IBC.2
Tests of scal policy sustainability based on cointegration tests are subject to biased
inference in case the underlying cointegrating relationship is subject to structural breaks.
Hakkio and Rush (1991), MacDonald (1992) and Haug (1995) address structural instability
by choosing the break dates exogenously. By contrast, Quintos (1995) uses tests determining
the break dates endogenously. She also introduces the concepts of strong- and weak-form s-
cal policy sustainability. Her denitions encompass and extend previous denitions. In view
of the generality of her approach we adopt it for our own econometric investigation below.
Strong-form sustainability is equivalent to the sustainability denition used by Hamilton and
cluding that a unit root cannot be rejected for Germany, France, Italy and Canada. Uctum and Wickens
(2000) use annual data over the period 1965-1994 testing for scal sustainability in the US and eleven EU
countries. They conclude that only Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and France were on a sustainable
scal path.
2Other studies using a cointegration framework to test the validity of the IBC in Europe include Bravo
and Silvestre (2002) and Afonso and Rault (2010) for eleven and fteen EU countries respectively. Both
studies reach mixed results with regards to the validity of the IBC in their sample countries.
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Flavins (1986) and Hakkio and Rush (1991). Under weak-form sustainability the limit term
in equation (2) converges to zero but at rate lower compared to the strong-form sustainability
case. Furthermore, under weak-form sustainability the limit term in equation (2) converges
to zero faster when government revenue and expenditure are cointegrated rather than when
they are not. Weak form sustainability implies that the level series of decit and undis-
counted debt may be mildly explosive, in which case an unpredictable adverse shock may
put public nances into an unsustainable path. As a result, under weak-form sustainability
the government may face di¢ culties marketing its debt and be obliged to pay higher interest
rates to service it. In terms of equation (3) scal policy is weak-form sustainable if 0 <  <
1, irrespective of whether Rt and Gt are cointegrated or not; weak-form sustainable if  =
1 and Rt and Gt are non-cointegrated; strong form sustainable if  = 1 and Rt and Gt are
cointegrated; and non-sustainable if  = 0. Quintos applies her methodology to US quar-
terly data covering the period 1947-1992. She concludes that the US scal policy is weakly
sustainable despite a negative structural break in the early 1980s causing non-cointegration
after 1980.
Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) use Quintoss methodology to test for scal policy sus-
tainability in four heavily indebted EMU countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy and the
Netherlands. They nd that the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 has caused
a structural break towards sustainability; and that scal policy at the eve of the euros in-
troduction in 1999 was strong-form sustainable in Ireland and weak-form sustainable in the
rest of their sample countries. Finally, they nd evidence of non-linear scal adjustment,
which is consistent with the ndings of Bohn (1998), Cipollini (2001), Sarno (2001), Arestis
et al (2004), Bajo-Rubio et al (2004, 2006), Chortareas et al (2008), Considine and Gallagher
(2008) and Cipollini et al (2009) for a host of di¤erent countries. These studies model the
dynamics of the discounted public debt series or the cointegrating vector between public
revenue and expenditure in a number of di¤erent countries using variants of threshold au-
toregressive (TAR) models. The intuition underlying these non-linear models is that scal
adjustment takes place more rapidly when budget decits or the stock of outstanding debt
exceed certain critical thresholds beyond which they are considered exceedingly large.
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Figure 1: Real government revenue and expenditure (both in log terms)
3 Data
For our econometric investigation we use data for UK total managed public expenditure
inclusive of interest payments on outstanding public debt and total public revenue excluding
seignorage. Our data source is the UKO¢ ce of National Statistic (ONS) data bank. The data
frequency is quarterly and covers the period 1955Q1-2006Q1. We calculate real government
revenue Rt and real government expenditure Gt deating nominal series by the GDP deator.
Figure 1 plots the de-seasonalised data in log real terms.3 Table 1 reports unit root tests
on the series log-levels and rst di¤erences. Both series are integrated of order one and
show a similar upward trend. However, there appears to be signicant divergence during
the 1970s and 1980s, indicating increasing decits over those periods and structural breaks
in any cointegrating relationship that may link the two series. Both the Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) (1979, 1981) and Phillips-Perron (PP) (1988) tests conrm that government
revenue and expenditure are rst di¤erence stationary (see Table 1).
3The original data series include strong seasonal e¤ects which we account for using a constant and three
seasonal dummies.
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Unit Root Tests Gt Rt
Levels 1st. Di¤. Levels 1st. Di¤.
ADF Test Statistic -1.744 -5.643 -1.086 -6.755
0.408 0.000** 0.722 0.000**
PP Test Statistic -1.274 -16.490 -0.848 -18.261
0.642 0.000** 0.803 0.000**
Table 1: Unit root test for deseasonalised Government expenditure G and revenue R
Notes on Table: MacKinnons critical values (MacKinnon, 1996) for rejection of hypothesis
of a unit root: values in parentheses are p-values, while ** indicates signicance at the 1% level.
The number of lags in the ADF tests is set using the AIC criterion; for the PP tests using the
Newey-West bandwidth.
4 Linear tests on scal policy sustainability
We start our econometric investigation on the sustainability of UK scal policy using the
linear cointegration framework discussed in section 2 above. We rst test for sustainability
without accounting for structural breaks in the cointegrating equation given by (3). We
use Dynamic OLS (DOLS) a cointegration method that is asymptotically equivalent to the
Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) cointegration methodologies with the extra
advantages of performing better in small samples and controlling for endogeneity among the
regressions variables through the inclusion of lead and lag di¤erences of the regressors (see
Stock and Watson, 1993). Given that both series include one unit root, the DOLS regression
is given by equation (4) below
Rt = + Gt +
kX
t= k
kGt k + "t (4)
where  denotes the rst di¤erence operator and "t is a random error term. If the residual
series "t is serially correlated, we estimate (3) using the Dynamic Generalised Least Squares
(DGLS) estimator. This augments equation (4) with autoregressive error terms under the
Feasible Generalised Least Squares. Under both DOLS and DGLS the cointegrating vector is
given by CV = Rt b bGt . The results of estimating equation (3) using DGLS are reported
in Table 3 below. Although the restriction  = 1 is not rejected, strong-from sustainability
is rejected as the reported ADF test is not signicant at the 5% level.
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Cointegration Analysis without breaks
DGLS
1955Q1-2006Q1
Estimated equation
Rt = + Gt + "tb 0.044(0.128)b 0.984(0.020)**
F-Wald test, H0 : b = 0 [p-value] 2443.31[0.000]**
F-Wald test, H0 : b = 1 [p-value] 0.609[0.435]
t-ADF test on b"t -2.693
5% critical value [-2.876]
S.E.of regression 0.055
Table 2: Cointegrating test for government revenue and expenditure
Notes on Table: standard errors in parentheses. ** indicate signicance at the 1% level. All
DGLS estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form in the
residuals (DOLS-HAC, see Newey and West, 1987).
Rejection of cointegration, however, may be due to structural breaks in the cointegrat-
ing relationship given by (3). To identify such breaks endogenously we use the sequential
cointegration stability test proposed by Quintos (1995) described by equations (5) to (7)
below
Rt = + Gt + (DtGt) + "t (5)
where,
Dt = 1 if t 2 T1 = f1; :::;mg (6)
Dt = 0 if t 2 T2 = fm+ 1; :::; Tg (7)
In equations (6) and (7) Dt is a dummy variable taking the value of unity before period
m and zero thereafter, where m represents the date of the tested breakpoint. The null
hypothesis of stability assumes  = 0 and is tested using a Wald F -test. Equation (5)
is estimated sequentially. Following Andrews (1993) we have trimmed 15 per cent from
the beginning and the end of the sample. We estimate equation (4) using DOLS and, for
robustness, OLS. Figure 2 plots the sequential Wald test statistics testing the restriction 
=0 over the period of 1963Q -1998Q4. Figure 2 suggests that the cointegrating relationship
between Rt and Gt has been subject to multiple structural breaks. More specically, it
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Figure 2: Sequential Wald tests for structural breaks
suggests a number of statistically signicant values for the depicted Wald statistics in the
early 1970s, the early 1980s and the second half of the 1990s. As structural breaks cannot
fall too close together, these three groupings of statistically signicant values are very likely
reecting three distinct structural breaks. We dene the exact timing of each of the three
breaks on the basis of highest F-score in each grouping. Using this criterion, both estimators
suggest breaks of almost identical timing, with DOLS suggesting the break points to be
1972Q3, 1981Q3 and 1997Q4, while OLS suggests 1972Q1, 1981Q4 and 1997Q3. These dates
can be related to important exogenous shifts in UK macroeconomic policy. The break in 1972
is close to the introduction of UK expansionary scal policies targeting the unemployment
rate through wage and income controls. The break in 1981 coincides with the introduction
of the scal consolidation e¤ort pursued by the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS),
a monetary and scal policy programme announced by the Conservative Government in late
1980. Finally, the break date in 1997 is close to the endorsement of the then newly-elected
Labour government of its predecessors relatively restrictive scal policies and the granting
of operational independence to the Bank of England, establishing further the monetary-
dominancerather than scal-dominancenature of the UK macroeconomic outlook.
Our next step is to test for UK scal policy sustainability accounting for the e¤ect of the
structural breaks identied above. We do so by estimating equation (8) below
Rt = + Gt +
jX
i=1
i(DitGt) + "t (8)
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Equation (8)modies the cointegrating regression given by equation (3) by including slope
dummy variables corresponding to each of the three breaks identied above. Each of the three
dummies Dit (j = 1; 2; 3) takes a zero value before the date of the corresponding break and
the value of unity thereafter (see Table 3). A positive (negative) coe¢ cient represents a
movement towards (away from) the strong-form sustainability. The augmented cointegrating
vector obtained by equation (8) is then given by
CV = Rt     Gt  
3X
i=1
i(DitGt) (9)
We estimate (8) using three alternative methodologies, namely DGLS, DOLS and simple
OLS. The break dates for the DGLS/DOLS and OLS estimates of equation (8) are respec-
tively dened on the basis of the highest score obtained from the DOLS and OLS estimator
for each grouping of statistically signicant F -statistics in Figure 2. The only exception is
the break of the early 1970s when equation (8) is estimated using the DGLS methodology.
By dening D1t to take the value of unity after 1972Q3 we could not obtain DGLS estimates
free of heteroskedasticity problems and obtained a marginally insignicant, at the 5% level,
dummy coe¢ cient. Experimenting with alternative denitions of D1t in the neighbourhood
of 1972Q3 we obtained the best data representation (in terms of a minimum score for the
Akaike information criterion and regression standard error) when D1t took the value of unity
from 1973Q3 onwards.
The results of our estimations are reported in Table 3. The coe¢ cients of all break dum-
mies turn out to be statistically signicant at the 5% level with the expected signs. More
specically, the coe¢ cient of the dummy capturing the break of the early 1970s is in all cases
negative suggesting a deteriorating scal outlook during the implementation of the scal ex-
pansion of that period. The positive and signicant coe¢ cients of the dummies capturing the
break of the early 1980s conrm the partial reversal of the expansionary dynamics established
in the early 1970s. Finally, the dummy variables capturing the break of 1997 have a positive
and signicant coe¢ cient, suggesting further improvement of the UKs public nances over
the period 1998-2006.
Finally, we use the ndings reported in Table 3 to test for weak and strong-form sustain-
ability. Unlike the ndings reported in Table 2, the DGLS results reported in Table 3 suggest
cointegration between government revenue and expenditure at the 5% level, while the DOLS
and OLS results suggest cointegration at the 6% level. As the DGLS model produces a signif-
icantly lower regression standard error, it seems to provide the best data representation. We
11
then test the null hypothesis of a unity total multiplier for the coe¢ cient of public expendi-
ture, given by H0 : +
kX
j=1
j = 1;for j = 1; 2; 3. For the DGLS and DOLS estimates the null
of a unity total multiplier is maintained. This, combined with the nding of cointegration in
our prefered DGLS estimation, suggests that following the structural breaks that occurred
in the early 1970s, 1980s and late 1990s, over the period 1955-2006 UK scal policy was on
a path of strong-form sustainability.
Cointegration Analysis with breaks
DGLS DOLS OLS
Estimated equation
Rt = + Gt + 1D1Gt + 2D2Gt + 3D3Gt + "tb 0.014(0.253) 0.161(0.165) 0.323(0.154)*b 0.997(0.042)** 0.968(0.027)** 0.939(0.025)**b1(D1 = 1 in 1972Q1-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) - - -0.006(0.003)*b1(D1 = 1 in 1972Q3-2006Q1 0 Otherwise) - -0.008(0.003)** -b1(D1 = 1 in 1973Q3-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) -0.015(0.004)** - -b2(D2 = 1 in 1981Q3-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) 0.007(0.003)* 0.005(0.002)** -b2(D2 = 1 in 1981Q4-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) 0.007(0.002)**b3(D3 = 1 in 1997Q3-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) - - 0.009(0.002)**b3(D3 = 1 in 1997Q4-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) 0.013(0.005)** 0.010(0.002)**
F-Wald test, H0 : b + b1 + b2 + b3 = 0 [p-value] 741.71[0.000]** 1688.07[0.000]** 1844.40[0.000]**
F-Wald test, H0 : b + b1 + b2 + b3 = 1 [p-value] 0.001[0.981] 1.040[0.309] 5.193[0.024]*
t-ADF test on b"t -2.880* -2.837 -2.851
5% critical value [-2.876] [-2.876] [-2.876]
S.E.of regression 0.021 0.047 0.050
Table 3: Cointegration analysis with endogenous structural breaks
Notes on Table: standard errors in parentheses. *, ** indicate signicance at the 5% and 1%
level, respectively. All DGLS estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of
unknown form in the residuals (DOLS-HAC, see Newey and West, 1987).
5 Linear error correction models
In the previous section we concluded that the post-war UK scal policy has been subject to
three structural breaks, giving rise to four scal regimes over the sample period respectively
covering the periods 1955-1972; 1973-1981; 1982-1997 and 1998-2006. In this section we es-
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timate linear error correction models (ECM) for each of these periods with a dual objective.
First, to establish whether scal policy reacts to scal disequilibrium as the latter is captured
by the cointegrating vector accounting for structural breaks. If for a particular period the
disequilibrium term enters the ECM with an insignicant coe¢ cient or a signicant coe¢ -
cient of positive sign, then the scal regime of that period is identied as non-Ricardian,
characterized by non-sustainable scal policy. Second, if scal policy reacts to deviations
from the long-run equilibrium path, estimates of ECMs will provide us information as to
whether the adjustment comes through the revenue or expenditure side, or both. A system
of two dynamic Error Correction Model (ECM) can be respectively written as
Rt = +
kX
i=1
iRt k +
kX
i=1
iGt k + b"t 1 + vt (10)
Gt = +
kX
i=1
iRt k +
kX
i=1
iGt k + b"t 1 + vt (11)
where, b"t 1 is the estimated cointegrating vector, obtained from the DGLS estimation of
equation (8)accounting for structural break and vt is a random error.
The results of our ECM estimations are reported in Table 4. The Table presents ECM
models estimated for the whole of our sample period as well as for each of the four sub-
periods dened by structural breaks identied in section 4 above. For each sample period
we present two ECMs, ECM1 and ECM2, respectively dening the dependent variable to
be Rt and Gt. We report parsimonious estimates (i.e. excluding insignicant terms)
obtained from initial models including four lags (i.e. k = 4) of Rt and Gt. For the
full-sample period and three out of four sub-periods, the coe¢ cient of the error correction
term  is statistically signicant with a negative sign in the equation modeling Rt and
not signicant in the equation modeling Gt. These ndings suggest a Ricardian regime,
consistent with scal policy sustainability and adjustment to any scal disequilibrium coming
from the revenue rather than expenditure side. This is an indication of UK authorities relying
more on tax increases rather than expenditure reductions to correct scal imbalances. On the
other hand, the period 1973Q3-1981Q2 seems exceptional. For that period, the  coe¢ cient
is insignicant in both ECM equations, suggesting lack of policy reaction to the increasing
at the time scal disequilibrium term. This is consistent with our ndings in the previous
section, suggesting a structural shift away from scal sustainability in the early 1970s and
the presence of a non-Ricardian regime in the 1970s.
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ECM(1) DepV:Rt 1955Q1-2006Q1 1955Q1-1973Q2 1973Q3-1981Q2 1981Q3-1997Q3 1997Q4-2006Q1b -0.131(0.031)** -0.258(0.050)** -0.249(0.170) -0.095(0.042)* -0.110(0.049)*b 0.005(0.002)** - - 0.006(0.003)* -b1 -0.291(0.065)** - -0.488(0.141)** -0.290(0.109)** -b2 - - - - -b3 0.164(0.062)** - - - -b4 - - - - -b1 -0.191(0.091)* -0.329(0.137)* - - -b2 - - - - -b3 - - 0.414(0.183)* -0.349(0.173)* -b4 - - -0.341(0.173)* -
S.E.of regression 0.022 0.021 0.027 0.021 0.020
Misspe. tests (p-values)
F -AR 0.91 0.68 1.00 0.29 0.18
F -ARCH 0.12 0.88 0.27 0.77 0.80
Normality 0.40 0.23 0.84 0.30 0.91
F -Het 0.44 0.16 0.07 0.72 0.21
ECM(2) DepV:Gt 1955Q1-2006Q1 1955Q1-1973Q2 1973Q3-1981Q2 1981Q3-1997Q3 1997Q4-2006Q1b -0.040(0.023) -0.035(0.051) 0.141(0.121) -0.003(0.030) -0.033(0.037)b 0.007(0.001)** 0.010(0.003)** - 0.004(0.002)* 0.014(0.003)**b1 - - - - -b2 - -0.215(0.088)* - - -0.258(0.109)*b3 - - -0.291(0.132)* - -b4 - - - - -b1 -0.219(0.066)** - - - -0.486(0.153)**b2 - - 0.376(0.171)* - -b3 - - 0.376(0.179)* - -b4 - - - - -
S.E.of regression 0.017 0.018 0.026 0.015 0.011
Misspe. tests (p-values) -
F -AR 0.57 0.76 0.10 0.45 0.99
F -ARCH 0.10 0.81 0.38 0.44 0.28
Normality 0.32 0.75 0.61 0.20 0.46
F -Het 0.77 0.40 0.06 0.49 0.54
Table 4: Error correction model for short run dynamic behaviours
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Notes on Table: standard errors in parentheses. *, ** indicate signicance at the 5% and
1% level, respectively. Some estimations include impulse dummy variables for outlier observations.
These are: for period 1955Q1-2006Q1, 1962Q4 in ECM(1) and 1974Q1 and 1974Q3 in ECM(2); for
period 1955Q1-1973Q2, 1962Q4 in ECM(1). The estimates for period 1973Q3-1981Q2 are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form in the residuals (OLS-HAC estimates).
F -AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F -test for residual serial correlation up to forth order. F -ARCH
is an F -test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Norm is the normality chi-Square
Bera-Jarque test for residualsnon-normality. F -Het is F -test for residuals heteroskedasticity.
6 Non-linear scal adjustment
We conclude our econometric analysis by testing for non-linear adjustment in UK scal
policy. The basic intuition underlying non-linear scal policy is that the government corrects
excessive decits at a rate faster than "normalones, which are corrected at a lower speed,
or perhaps not corrected at all. The hypothesis of linear scal policy can be tested using the
testing procedure by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994). This is based on
the auxiliary regression given by equation (12) below
b"t = 00+ X
j=1
 
0jb"t j + 1jb"t jb"t d + 2jb"t jb"2t d + 3jb"t jb"3t d+4b"2t d+5b"3t d+!t (12)
In (12) "t denotes the estimated scal disequilibrium term accounting for structural breaks
given by the estimated residuals obtained from the DGLS estimation of equation (8);  is
the order of the autoregressive parameter determined by the partial autocorrelation function
of "t (see Granger and Teräsvirta(1993)); d is the delay parameter of the transition function;
and !t is an the error term with Gaussian distribution. The null hypothesis of linearity is
described by H0 : 1j = 2j = 3j = 4 = 5 = 0; for all j 2 (1; 2; :::). This is tested
using a general LM -type test, denoted by LMG, estimated for all plausible values of d. If
any of the LMG statistics is statistically signicant the linearity hypothesis is rejected. If
more than one LMG statistics are signicant the value of d is determined by the highest
F -score. If linearity is rejected we determine the specic form of non-linearity following
the approach by Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992). In terms of equation (12) this involves
three steps. First, conditional upon LMG being signicant we test the null described by
H0 : 3j = 5 = 0; for all j 2 (1; 2; :::). This test is denoted as LML1. If LML1 is signicant
we conclude that non-linearity is of the logistic form. If LML1 is not signicant we test
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Figure 3: Partial autocorrelation function (CV accounts for structural breaks, 1955-2006)
the null of H0 : 1j = 2j = 4 = 0j3j = 5 = 0;for all j 2 (1; 2; :::). We denote this
test as LMQ. If LMQ is signicant we conclude that non-linearity is quadratic. If both
LML1 and LM _Q are insignicant we perform a third test, LML2, where the null is given by
H0 : 1j = 0j2j = 3j = 4 = 5 = 0;for all j 2 (1; 2; :::). A statistically signicant LML2
indicates linearity of the logistic type.
Given the relatively small number of observations in each of the scal regimes identied in
the previous section we test for non-linear scal adjustment using the whole of the available
sample period. Figure 3 presents the partial autocorrelation function of the series obtained
from estimating equation (8) with DGLS, i.e. the DGLS estimates of the cointegrating
vector accounting for structural breaks. This is statistically signicant up to the second lag,
therefore we estimate (12) setting  = 2.
The results of the non-linearity tests are reported in Table 5. We report ndings for d
= 1, 2, 3 and 4. We obtain a signicant LMG score for d=1, thus rejecting the hypothesis
of linear scal adjustment. For d=1 the LML1 and LMQ are insignicant and signicant
respectively. Therefore, we conclude the existence of non-linearity of quadratic type. This
implies the existence of two scal regimes, dened by an upper and lower critical decit
threshold value. Decit values within the critical thresholds belong to the inner regime,
interpreted as normal decit values. Decit values below the lower critical threshold denote
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an exceedingly large scal decit, calling for more aggressive correction. Finally, decit values
above the upper critical threshold denote an exceptionally small decit value, or a surplus,
which scal authorities may use as a cushion allowing a fast increase in spending and/or
reduction in taxation, bringing the decit back into its normal range.
 = 2
d LMG LML1 LMQ LML2
1 7.523[0.000]** 1.717[0.182] 13.775[0.000]** N/A
2 0.989[0.434] 1.321[0.269] 1.073[0.362] 0.064[0.801]
3 1.151[0.335] 2.115[0.124] 1.057[0.350] 0.265[0.767]
4 0.522[0.791] 1.130[0.325] 0.277[0.759] 0.161[0.852]
Table 5: Test for non-linear scal adjustment
Notes on Table: The p-value are in square brackets, ** represents signicance at 1% level.
We model quadratic non-linearity using the Quadratic-Logistic Smooth Threshold Error
Correction Model(QL-STECM). This is given by equations(13) to(16)below
Rt = tS1t + (1  t)S2t + vt (13)
S1t = 1 +
nX
i=1
1iRt i +
pX
i=0
1iGt i + 1b"t 1 (14)
S2t = 2 +
nX
i=1
2iRt i +
pX
i=0
2iGt i + 2b"t 1 (15)
t = pr

L 6 b"t d 6 U	 = 1  1
1 + e (b"t d L)(b"t d U ) (16)
Equations (14) and (15) are standard linear error-correction models, capturing the two
scal regimes, the inner (S1) and the outer (S2). Within the inner regime adjustment towards
equilibrium takes place at a speed described by 1. At the outer regime, adjustment takes
place at a rate equal to 2. Our expectation is that j2 j>j1j denoting faster adjustment in the
outer rather than the inner regime. Equation(13) models period-to-period scal adjustment
as a weighted average of S1 and S2. The regime weight t is dened in (16) as the probability
that the transition variable "t d takes values within the inner regime boundaries, with 
denoting the speed of transition between these two regimes.
The estimates of the parsimonious QL-STECM model are reported in Table 6. The
estimated coe¢ cient of the error correction term in the inner regime (S1) is insignicant,
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suggesting no correction of decits. By contrast, the coe¢ cient of the error correction term
in the outer regime (S2) is signicant, with both critical thresholds U and L being negative
and signicant. These suggest correction of excessive large decits. They also suggest that
UK governments correct (push back into the inner regime) any temporary small decits and
surpluses.4 The QL-STECM has good econometric properties, as it passes all misspecication
tests. It also ts the data better than its linear counterpart reported in the rst column of
Table 4, as suggested by its lower regression standard error.
S1 S2
Constant 0.028(0.012)* -0.001(0.002)
Gt - 0.440(0.097)**
Rt 1 -0.336(0.139)*
Rt 5 - 0.204(0.077)**b"t 1 0.564(0.361) -0.122(0.029)**
 768.64(929.9)
U -0.012(0.003)**
L -0.053(0.003)**
S.E.of regression 0.021
Misspecication tests (p-values)
F -AR 0.42
F -ARCH 0.21
Norm 0.55
F -Het 0.73
Table 6: Non-linear scal adjustment model QL-STECM
Notes on Table: Standard errors in parentheses. *,** denote signicance at 5% and 1% level
respectively. The model has been estimated using two dummy variables for outlier observations, in
1962Q4 and 1973Q2 respectively. F -AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F -test for residual serial corre-
lation up to fourth order. F -ARCH is an F -test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.
Norm is the normality chi-square Bera-Jarque test for residualsnon-normality. F -Het is an F -test
for residual heteroskedasticity.
4These ndings are consistent with those reported by Considine and Gallagher (2008), who base their
analysis on non-linearities indentied for the UK debt to GDP ratio series.
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Figure 4: Estimated transition function
Figure 4 plots the transition function  ("t;; ), i.e. the probability of a regime change
in the current period against the transition variable "t 1, the value of scal disequilibrium in
the previous period. We would intuitively expect  ("t;; ) to increase as the scal outlook
deteriorates beyond the lower decit threshold, calling for a fast correction of decits; or
increases above the upper decit threshold, providing the government the opportunity to
introduce higher expenditure or reduce taxation. In both cases we would expect a high
value of  ("t;; ) capturing a high probability of a transition from the outer regime to the
inner. By contrast, when the scal disequilibrium term takes values within the inner regime,
we would expect a low value for  ("t;; ), denoting a low probability of switching from
the inner regime to the outer. Figure 4 provides evidence consistent with our expectations.
As expected, the probability of regime change is lowest when the transition variable takes
its mean value (-0.026) which lies comfortably within the inner regime dened by [-0.056,
-0.012]. On the other hand, the probability of a switch from the outer to the inner regime
convergences to unity fast as the lagged disequilibrium term moves away from the models
estimated critical thresholds.
Finally, Figure 5 depicts the estimated t parameter over our sample period and its
smoothed two-year moving average value. The value of t denotes the probability of being
in the inner regime, i.e. expectations of being in the regime of normal, and by implication
sustainable, decit values. From that point of view it can be seen as a rough measure of
credibility of the current scal policy stance providing an indication regarding expectations
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Figure 5: Transition Function 1955Q1-2006Q1
of its sustainability. We observe that that this probability is declining rapidly since the early
1970s, when the UK scal decit had entered a period of non-sustainable scal dynamics
as discussed in section 5 above. By contrast, the second half of the 1980s saw a signicant
increase in the value of t , suggesting increasing condence in the sustainability of the im-
proved scal outlook achieved by the UK authorities initiated over that decade. Expectations
of being in the inner regime record another marked reduction during the recession of the early
1990s, recovering however within a short period of time coinciding with the high growth rates
the UK economy registered following its exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992.
Finally, we observe another sharp decline in the value of t in the late 1990s. Most likely,
however, this is not the result of a substantial deterioration of the UK scal outlook but a
substantial improvement, leading to expectations that the surpluses the UK economy had
been recording over those years (see Figure 1 ) would not last for long. Indeed, and as Figure
1 suggests, in the subsequent decade of the 2000s public expenditure increased much faster
than revenue expectations, eliminating the temporary surpluses achieved in the late 1990s
pushing back the decit within its normalrange and, as Figure 5 suggests, increasing the
probability that the latter will stay there.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper we have tested for scal policy sustainability in the UK over the period 1955-
2006. Using quarterly data and a unied framework of analysis we have addressed four
interrelated questions. First, we tested for scal policy sustainability accounting for exoge-
nous shifts in UK scal policy, which we identify using tests for endogenous structural breaks.
Second, we assessed the nature of scal policy (Ricardian versus non-Ricardian) in each of
the scal regimes identied by our structural stability analysis. Third, we tested whether de-
viations from scal sustainability are corrected through adjustments in government revenue
or expenditure. Finally, we have tested for non-linearities in UK scal policy.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows: First, UK scal policy has been sus-
tainable over the period under examination 1955-2006. Second, it has been subject to three
structural breaks, respectively located in the early 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s. These
coincide with important shifts in UK scal policy, with the rst break moving government
nances away from sustainability and the remaining two towards it. Third, scal policy was
sustainable during all sub-periods identied by our analysis, with the exception of 1973-1981
when the UK scal regime was non-Ricardian. Fourth, correction of deviations from s-
cal sustainability has been taking place through adjustment of public revenue rather than
expenditure. Finally, we nd evidence of non-linearities in UK scal policy, with the UK
government not reacting to relatively small decit values; but correcting exceedingly large
decits relatively fast. Our ndings also imply fast correction of exceedingly small decits
or temporary surpluses, which we interpret as evidence that UK authorities use unusually
favourable scal conditions as a cushion allowing a fast increase in spending and/or reduction
in taxation.
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that UK public nances and the
reputation of UK authorities as a scally sound borrower were relatively well placed to cope
with the scal downturn initiated by the global credit crunch of 2007-2008. The intensity
of the crisis, however, and the signicant ensuing increase in UK public debt have left UK
authorities with no room for complacency. There is, of course, ample room for a debate on
how fast and in which particular way scal adjustment will be best achieved. Nevertheless,
there is little doubt that to maintain sustainable government nances, UK scal policy would
have to be prudent in coming years. In this e¤ort, the credibility of a sound sovereign borrower
the UK has accumulated in previous years, as suggested by our analysis, will be a signicant
advantage.
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